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MANAGEMENT AUDIT REPORT
of
FIRE DEPARTMENT

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Los Angeles, Fire dept.

Fire-depts -- Management -- CA -- LA

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
SUMMARY	4
RECOMMENDATIONS	7
EVALUATION	11
ORGANIZATION	11
•Decentralization of Fire Prevention Inspection Activities	12
•Decentralization of Geographic Command Structure	14
STAFFING	16
•Constant Manning	16
•Fire Station Staffing	21
•Alternative Shift Scheduling	27
•Civilianization Potential	29
•Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service	33
•Competitive Sports Injuries	34
FIRE PROTECTION PLANNING	37
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION	42
CODE ENFORCEMENT	45
TRACTOR COMPANY	50
HELICOPTER COMPANY	51
TRAINING	52
LONGEVITY PAY	54
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM	56

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the findings and recommendations of the third Management Audit of the Fire Department. The basic field work on the audit was completed in January, 1978. Previous audits were conducted in 1965 and in 1973.

The Fire Department controls and extinguishes injurious or dangerous fire; protects life and property from fire risks by inspecting buildings for fire hazards and enforces laws relating to fire prevention; carries on a fire prevention education program; investigates suspected cases of arson; and provides rescue service, salvage service, paramedic and emergency ambulance service.

The Department's services are provided from many locations, including 103 fire stations which house firefighting personnel, apparatus, and specialized equipment suited to the tasks which they perform. Rescue ambulance teams provide emergency medical service from locations throughout the City. The Department's administrative headquarters is located in City Hall East which also houses the Fire Emergency Communications Center, Bureau of Fire Prevention and Public Safety, and staff support functions.

The Department's 1977-78 Budget provides for direct appropriations of \$97.7 million and directly related costs in other budget appropriations of \$52.4 million, or a total of approximately \$150 million. There is provision for 3,555 regular employees consisting of 3,070 uniformed personnel and 485 civilians.

From 1967-68 to 1977-78, the total Fire Department budget, including directly related costs in other budget appropriations, has increased from approximately \$57.9 million to \$150 million or 159%. This increase is slightly more than the total City budget which has grown from \$369.5 million to \$1,028 million or 148% in the last ten years.

The increasing cost of operations is perhaps more clearly illustrated in the per capita cost for fire protection in the City of Los Angeles which has increased from about \$20 per capita in 1967-68 to \$50 per capita in 1976-77. However, at the

MEMORANDUM

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide information regarding the proposed changes to the existing policy on the subject of [illegible].

2. The proposed changes are based on the findings of the study conducted by the [illegible] and are intended to improve the efficiency of the [illegible] process.

3. The proposed changes are as follows: [illegible]

4. It is recommended that the proposed changes be implemented as soon as possible to ensure the [illegible] of the [illegible] process.

5. The proposed changes are subject to the approval of the [illegible] and the [illegible].

6. The proposed changes are subject to the approval of the [illegible] and the [illegible].

same time that the cost of operations was going up, the number of firefighters decreased from 3423 in 1967-68 to 2988 in 1976-77.

The following basic statistics provide information regarding the volume of Fire Department activities:

	<u>1975-76</u>	<u>1976-77</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
<u>Fire Incidents</u>			
Structure Fires	9,317	8,758	- 6.0
Non-Structure Fires	22,260	19,589	-12.0
<u>Other Fire Company Incidents</u>			
False Alarms	6,960	7,710	+10.8
Out of City	432	244	-43.5
All others*	16,448	16,957	+ 3.1
<u>Rescue Incidents</u>			
Ambulance	147,600	149,857	+ 1.5
Engine and Truck	1,681	1,700	+ 1.1
<u>Greater Alarms</u>	233	164	-29.6
<u>Fire Deaths</u>	101	85	-15.8
<u>Company Fire Prevention Inspections</u>	381,797	418,340	+ 9.6
<u>Bureau of Fire Prevention Inspections</u>	57,123	52,258	- 8.5

During this audit, personnel at all levels in all functional areas of Departmental operations were interviewed, and were very cooperative. Visits were also made to the Los Angeles County Department of Forester and Fire Warden, the City of Long Beach Fire Department, and the Ventura County Fire Department.

* Includes a wide variety of types of incidents, e.g., electrical failures, food on stove, natural gas leak, smoke scare, etc.

Representatives of the Insurance Services Office (ISO), Pacific Region, were also interviewed. The Audit Team wishes to acknowledge the open, receptive attitude with which the Chief Engineer of the Fire Department has approached the entire effort. Members of the Board of Fire Commissioners contacted were also very helpful, and their assistance is recognized with appreciation.

Although the review of the Department has been comprehensive, this report does not attempt to comment on each activity. The primary treatment and emphasis is placed upon those activities which provide the greatest opportunity for improvement in the view of the Audit Team.

The audit specifically has not addressed the subjects of large-scale City-County consolidation, the Fire Command Control System, mutual aid and brush clearance. Each of these matters has been designated either for separate study, or, as in the case of the Command Control System, is a candidate for potential litigation.

The findings and recommendations of the audit have been reviewed by the Chief Engineer and he has concurred with them on a general level. Many of the proposals contained in this report originated with Department management and there is substantial agreement on the issues. The Department has already taken steps to advance a number of the proposals described.

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SUMMARY

The Los Angeles City Fire Department is generally regarded as being without peer among large municipal fire protection organizations. As was the case in the two previous audits of the Department, we have found in this instance an effectively managed, highly trained and eminently capable force of motivated personnel. The performance of the Department in providing emergency assistance is clearly superior.

Tradition rightfully underlies many of the methods and operating practices of the fire service. However, the continuing validity of certain traditions in 1978 when local government is sorely stressed by escalating costs should be examined in all City functions, including fire protection. We have found in the present management team of the Fire Department a unique and most encouraging willingness to test long standing tradition with a view to identifying reasonable alternatives. It is this enlightened perspective which permits recognition of problems and the potential for improvement, and creates a receptive climate for positive change.

The Chief Engineer has identified the need to reorient the basic scheme of priorities in the Department to bring about much greater recognition of the relative importance of fire prevention activities. Although efforts aimed at this objective have been ongoing, the existing organizational structure has been a handicap in terms of focusing a proper level of attention and emphasis on fire prevention. There is a need to move directly to geographically decentralize and merge the existing Fire Prevention Bureau with the Fire Suppression and Rescue Bureau.

The use of constant manning overtime to provide coverage of fire suppression positions has proven both effective and highly economical. Savings resulting from constant manning as opposed to hiring additional personnel amount to several million dollars. Efforts should be continued, as advocated in this report, to obtain full utilization of constant manning by developing ways to increase the number of potential volunteers. Consistent with this approach, it is also recommended that 60 Firefighter positions, added but not filled in the 1977-78 Budget, be deleted.

As documented in the 1973 Management Audit, the issue of efficient personnel utilization remains as perhaps the most important of concerns facing Department management. Traditionally, the City has staffed all fire facilities of a type (e.g., single-engine company) in the same manner based on standards established by the Insurance Services Office (ISO). We endorse the position of the Chief Engineer that calls for variable staffing of facilities based on demonstrated need which takes into account such factors as time of year, time of day, location and specific conditions, and availability of back-up coverage. A comprehensive proposal should be developed for policy level review in the City. The possibility of greater utilization of civilian personnel to perform certain support duties traditionally assigned to uniformed personnel should be examined as recommended. An expanded scope is proposed for the Department's training program to permit this presently effective activity to be further improved.

We have reviewed alternative shift scheduling techniques for fire protection which other agencies have tried and are now trying, and we have found no compelling reasons to abandon the present 24-hour duty schedule.

Civilian ambulance personnel provide emergency medical and ambulance service to the citizens of Los Angeles as an integral part of the total Fire Department involvement in emergency medicine. Although civilians have performed this function well, factors have arisen in recent years which pose the question as to whether civilians should continue to be used on ambulances. The report recommends a pilot program at selected stations whereby existing firefighters, after being trained as paramedics would provide emergency medical and ambulance service in place of civilians. The ultimate replacement of many civilian personnel without increasing the number of uniformed personnel has substantial cost saving potential.

Fire protection master planning at the local level is strongly advocated by the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, Department of Commerce. The comprehensive assessment of the total fire protection problem of the City, and the most appropriate use of resources to address the problem is a priority concern of Fire Department management. It is recommended that this planning concept be advanced in the form of a proposal for testing its applicability in several areas of the City, including the Los Angeles Harbor area.

The Department has a number of independent automated systems which should be integrated within the framework of a management information system. This process should begin with a master planning effort conducted by a systems sub-group in the Planning Section to be staffed with appropriately trained civilian personnel.

Various plan checking and construction inspection activities of the Fire Department overlap or duplicate efforts of Department of Building and Safety personnel. A cooperative effort to reduce or eliminate such occurrences is recommended.

It appears likely that the Los Angeles County Fire Department can assume all or a portion of the work performed by the City Tractor Company. A cooperative study between City and County departments is proposed. Examination of the operations of the Helicopter Company indicates the need for a future functional audit of the City's use of helicopters for all purposes.

The Department has an outstanding physical training program which is designed to maintain a high level of conditioning based on programmed on-duty activities. Experience has shown that certain competitive sports are the cause of a disproportionate number of injuries sustained either on-duty or as approved off-duty activity. The Department should drop the practice of allowing injuries sustained by off-duty participation in sanctioned sports activities to qualify for disability claims and compensation, and eliminate handball, racquetball and volleyball from the approved list of on-duty athletic activities.

Review of the longevity payment practice for uniformed personnel reveals that the original conditions which warranted the practice no longer exist. A recommendation is made to eliminate the practice for future firefighters.

The Department is making progress in the pursuit of its Affirmative Action goals consistent with the specific requirements of the 1974 Consent Decree.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To facilitate the review of the audit recommendations, two types of recommendation--policy and administrative--have been identified. Generally, this division should provide guidance in focusing the attention of Department Management, the Mayor and the City Council.

Policy

It is recommended that the Mayor and Council:

1. Delete the 60 additional Firefighter position authorities which were added in the 1977-78 Budget.
2. Eliminate longevity payments for future firefighters.

It is recommended that Fire Department Management:

3. Prepare a variable staffing proposal based upon known factors of fire incidence by type, season and time of day, considering available backup support, fire potential and the need for increased fire prevention inspection, and other special needs of different areas in the City.
 - a. Upon approval from the Mayor and Council, implement the variable staffing proposal on a trial basis over at least a one year period beginning September 1, 1978.
 - b. Closely monitor the costs and benefits of variable staffing over the one year trial period, and make a quarterly report to the Mayor and City Council regarding its overall impact on tactical planning and operations.
4. Present a proposal for approval by the Board of Fire Commissioners, Mayor and City Council, which outlines the requirements for testing a fire protection master

planning process in several areas of the City. Include within the general development of a City fire protection plan a specific plan for the Harbor area to be prepared with the participation of the management of the Harbor Department and other affected community groups.

5. Conduct a pilot program at selected stations where existing firefighters will be trained as paramedics to provide emergency medical and ambulance service instead of civilians, and report to the Mayor and City Council on the feasibility of expanding this method of operation through attrition of civilian paramedics and ambulance personnel or by placing them into existing firefighter positions.
6. Coordinate with the Superintendent of Building in developing and implementing necessary legislative and procedural changes which will minimize the present duplication of work in plan checking and construction inspection while retaining necessary control over the enforcement of life and fire safety provisions of the Fire Code by the Department. Prepare a status report to the Mayor and City Council on or before November 1, 1978.
7. Undertake a study, in cooperation with the Los Angeles County Fire Chief, to determine if the County Fire Department can assume all or at least a major portion of the work now performed by the City Tractor Company, and report to the Mayor and City Council on appropriate action including the feasibility of personnel reductions.


Administrative

8. Eliminate the Bureau of Fire Prevention and establish three geographic bureaus in lieu of the present Bureau of Fire Suppression and Rescue, to encompass responsibility for fire prevention and fire suppression and rescue as described in this report. Proceed with the development and implementation of the planned decentralization and merger of fire prevention inspection activities into geographic fire suppression units.

9. To the greatest extent possible, use constant manning overtime to fill required positions in lieu of additional hiring .
 - a. Develop an estimate of additional constant manning overtime funds required pursuant to this recommendation.
 - b. Evaluate the feasibility of increasing the availability of constant manning volunteers as follows:
 - 1) Allow personnel in headquarters and other non-suppression positions to work overtime in the fire stations so long as it does not conflict with their primary duty assignments.
 - 2) Allow personnel to work earned vacation time within specific limitations instead of requiring them to take such time off.
 - 3) Require personnel to work major holiday weekends and other selected weekends if they are scheduled, as is now the policy for major holidays.
 - c. Report to the Mayor by September 1, 1978, on the status of efforts to accomplish this recommendation and its components.
10. Conduct feasibility studies on the potential civilianization of the uniformed positions identified in this report setting forth their duties, numbers of positions, and cost savings, if applicable.
11. Establish a civilian systems planning and analysis capability in the Planning Section for the purpose of preparing a master plan for the development of fire information systems based on current and projected requirements. This effort should be consistent with the intent of Recommendation No. 10 and the related section of this report dealing with potential civilianization.

12. Take the following steps to improve the Department's Training Program:
 - a) With the assistance of the Personnel Department and the City Administrative Officer, prepare an inventory of the Fire Department's training needs; determine the staffing, uniformed and civilian, necessary to develop, conduct, monitor, evaluate, and revise training courses for in-house Fire Department training, as well as a program for outside training of senior officers.
 - b) Promote stability and continuity of training practices through careful selection and long-term assignment of uniformed staff and by maximum utilization of professional civilian staff in the Training Section.
 - c) Increase the scope of the Training Section's responsibilities to include monitoring, evaluation, and reporting on the quality and quantity of training conducted in the field.
 - d) Revise the curriculum for Recruit Training and for the Company Officer Management and Operations Course to place increased emphasis on the fire prevention function.
13. Eliminate the competitive sports of handball, racquetball and volleyball from the approved list of on-duty athletic activities.
14. Eliminate the practice of allowing injuries sustained by off-duty participation in certain sanctioned athletic activities to qualify for disability claims and compensation.

LOS ANGELES FIRE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION



EVALUATION

ORGANIZATION

The Audit Team has carefully examined the command and organizational structure of the Fire Department and discussed with the Chief Engineer general and specific organizational objectives which he is considering. The current organization of the Department is as shown on the accompanying chart.

Within the current structure, the Operations function consists of three Bureaus (Fire Suppression and Rescue, Fire Prevention and Public Safety, and Support Services), each headed by a Deputy Chief reporting through the Deputy Chief in charge of Operations to the Chief Engineer. Fire suppression forces are administered through three geographic divisions each headed by three Assistant Chiefs assigned respectively to one of three 24 hour shifts. Fire prevention forces as well as Support Services personnel, are centrally controlled, although the majority of fire prevention inspection activity is performed by personnel assigned to firefighting duties.

For a number of years, there has been a strong national trend to add new emphasis to the entire fire prevention activity. This fact is substantiated by definitive materials published by the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control. The Chief Engineer, based on his personal experience and awareness of the national trend, has stated his intention to substantially change the relative emphasis of fire prevention and fire suppression. To accomplish this objective, the Chief Engineer proposes to decentralize and merge fire prevention inspection activities with fire suppression activities. A major effect of this operational change would be the elimination of the Bureau of Fire Prevention and Public Safety.

A closely related potential organization change involving the command structure for operations should also receive serious consideration by Department management. Consistent with the desire to establish a higher level of local identification with community fire protection requirements, and the proposed decentralization of fire prevention activities, there should be a corresponding shift of full command

responsibility and authority to geographically decentralized satellite headquarters. Such a move would be consistent with the large-scale Police Department command decentralization which occurred during the period 1971 to 1973.

This Office, based on the Audit Team contacts with Department management, supports the organizational/operational modifications described generally in the preceding material and in more detail in the following discussion.

Decentralization of Fire Prevention Inspection Activities

Fire prevention inspections in the Department are currently conducted both by firefighters assigned to fire stations throughout the City and Fire Inspectors in the Bureau of Fire Prevention and Public Safety. More than twice as many general occupancy inspections are currently performed by fire station personnel than by personnel from the Bureau, but the more complex and specialized inspections of industrial and commercial structures, health care facilities, churches, schools, and other places of public assemblage are conducted by inspectors in the Fire Prevention Bureau. Fire prevention work has been traditionally performed on both a centralized and decentralized basis in the manner described above by most of the fire departments in the nation.

In 1973, the Report of the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control articulated the need for more emphasis to be placed on fire prevention. This report, entitled "America Burning," indicated a need for a higher level of public awareness of the magnitude of the fire problem, more education of both adults and children in fire safety, better fire prevention training for fire personnel, the continuing improvement of construction materials and built-in fire protection features in buildings, improved building and fire prevention codes, and an expansion of fire research efforts. One of the Commission's recommendations was that "local governments make fire prevention at least equal to suppression in the planning of fire department priorities."

In the previous Management Audit of the Fire Department conducted in 1973, recommendations were made that the Department develop a plan for shifting more of the responsibility for fire prevention inspections from the Fire Prevention Bureau to the

Bureau of Fire Suppression and Rescue, and to implement this plan over a period of three years. These recommendations included the concept of decentralizing some of the Fire Prevention Bureau Units with provision being made for Bureau personnel to give guidance and training to fire suppression personnel to increase their effectiveness in the fire prevention work. It was also recommended that companies conduct fire prevention inspections as a unit whenever possible to increase both the quantity and quality of inspections.

It is the intent of the Chief Engineer to place more emphasis on increasing public awareness of the fire problem, and to increase the fire prevention responsibilities of fire suppression personnel. As a first step toward accomplishing this, the Chief Engineer recently created the new staff position of Community Liaison Officer which will supervise the Public Service Unit and the Fire Safety Education Unit, both formerly located in the Fire Prevention Bureau. This will enable the Chief to maintain close personal contact with organizational units which are in daily contact with the public.

In addition, the Chief Engineer has indicated his desire to develop and implement a plan for the decentralization and merger of most of the fire prevention inspection activities into the geographic fire suppression units. As a means of accomplishing this, the Chief envisions a progressive transfer of industrial and commercial, and public assemblage and institutional inspections from the Fire Prevention Bureau to the Bureau of Fire Suppression forces in the field. Training and guidance in the new responsibilities will be initially provided to the fire suppression personnel by the present specialized fire prevention personnel. Department management anticipates that continuing increased training emphasis in fire prevention will be provided in training academy classes and through in-service company training. (See discussion in this report under the heading of Training).

Under this program, field commanders will become responsible for conducting the entire range of fire inspections currently made by the Fire Prevention Bureau, with the possible exception of a few of the more specialized kinds of inspections. The specialized Arson Investigation and Engineering and Research Units currently in the Fire Prevention Bureau would remain at Fire Department Headquarters as centralized support units.

Placing greater responsibility for fire prevention on fire suppression personnel should increase the effectiveness of the Department's "Goals Oriented Fire Prevention Program". Under this program, statistics pertaining to the type, severity, and location of fires are accumulated by fire suppression companies and battalions, then goals are established for reducing the fire problem and programs are developed and implemented to achieve the goals. With the new decentralized organization, fire prevention activities can be tailored to a greater degree to the specific problems encountered in each of the company and battalion areas throughout the City. (See Recommendation No. 8).

Decentralization of Geographic Command Structure

Under the present organizational/operational structure, there are three geographic divisions each headed by three Assistant Chiefs assigned to A, B or C shift (platoon) duty for 24 hour periods. The geographic divisions presently do not provide a full range of fire prevention inspection activities. If the decentralization/merger discussed in the previous section occurs as planned, each geographic command will have much greater responsibility and authority regarding fire prevention.

We believe it would be advantageous to the Department and public to rearrange the field command structure concurrently with the fire prevention decentralization. The two elements are mutually compatible and would reinforce one another. More responsibility and authority to the geographic command level can be better assimilated if there is one chief officer in charge of each area. There would be one command voice for all three shifts in each area, thereby strengthening the unity of command. The increased responsibility accruing to the newly configured geographic entities justifies their designation as full operating bureaus (rather than divisions), and assignment of a Deputy Fire Chief in charge of each. The Deputy Chief in charge of each bureau would then act as the "Fire Chief" for his area. (See Recommendation No. 8)

The above changes will also require the Department to provide new organizational relationships for certain activities such as arson investigation, specialized prevention work, Fire Code development, and ambulance coordination. It will be necessary to reevaluate the continued need for the present number of command and staff positions after this change, and to reconsider the necessity of routinely dispatching Assistant

Chiefs to all greater alarm fires and Deputy Chiefs to greater alarm fires involving 15 companies or more.

It should be the Department's objective to accomplish these major organizational changes within a framework of economy, avoiding the prospect of any cost increases.

STAFFING

The Audit Team has examined a number of significant staffing considerations based on preliminary discussion with Department management and the labor-intensive character of the fire service. There follows specific discussion of staffing issues which seem to offer the most potential for improvement.

1. Constant Manning

Fire station staffing is based upon an authorization of 910 (recently increased to 916) positions for each of three shifts. In order to maintain a constant level of staffing, off-duty personnel are "hired back" on an overtime basis to fill in for absences due to illness, vacation and other compensated time off. This system of Scheduled Overtime Duty (SOD) has saved the City several million dollars annually in pension and fringe benefit costs which would otherwise be paid additional full-time firefighters hired to fill in for intermittent absences.

During Council deliberations on the 1977-78 Budget, concern was expressed regarding the voluntary nature of SOD as it affects the goal of constant staffing. It was argued that an insufficient number of firefighters had been volunteering to work overtime, resulting in periodic staffing shortages, especially on weekends. In an effort to make up for the lack of sufficient overtime volunteers, 60 new Firefighter positions were added in the 1977-78 Budget to provide a "manpower pool" to fill in for intermittent absences and reduce management's reliance on voluntary overtime.

The difficulty experienced in maintaining a constant staffing level seems to stem more from the excessive number of vacancies the Department is carrying than from a lack of volunteers to work overtime. The SOD system was originally intended to provide overtime volunteers to cover an 18% compensated time off factor among the regular full-time personnel. The plan assumed that on any given shift, 18% or 164 of 910 assigned personnel would be absent on compensated time off. This meant that 164 men from an off-duty shift would be hired on overtime to cover the absences and maintain staffing at the maximum level of 910 on-duty.

The system worked well so long as most regular full-time positions were filled. However, in the last few years a combination of events has created a sizeable vacancy factor, requiring the use of overtime volunteers to an extent not anticipated when the SOD system was established. One reason for the vacancies has been a high attrition rate due to the retirement of many 25-30 year veterans who joined the force right after World War II. In addition, the City has had difficulty hiring new personnel due to the complicated recruitment and testing procedures required in accordance with the 1974 Consent Decree which mandates extensive minority hiring. (See discussion under heading of Affirmative Action).

At the time of the audit there were 190 vacancies among the positions authorized for fire station staffing. Not only has overtime been used to cover the normal 18% factor for compensated time off, it has also been used to fill in for the large number of vacancies. During the sample period July 1, 1977 through September 13, 1977, overtime volunteers constituted nearly one-fourth of the on-duty personnel as opposed to the 18% normally expected. To a significant extent, this additional reliance on SOD volunteers has consistently provided an overall staffing level within 2% of the maximum 910 authorized.

Although the use of overtime has provided sufficient manpower to maintain average weekday staffing at 98% of the maximum, the Department has experienced a more significant number of shortages on weekends and holidays. Continuing vacancies provide so much overtime opportunity for regular personnel, that many of them choose not to volunteer to work on weekends and holidays. In addition, personnel scheduled to work weekends are frequently absent on either sick time or vacation. As a result, staffing levels on those days average 95% of the authorized maximum. Although this continues to be a concern of Department management, the fact that there appears to be specific potential for personnel reductions (as described, for instance, in the context of variable staffing) suggests a lesser degree of significance may attend this issue in the future.

Department officials are concerned about this experience because shortages resulting from a lack of overtime volunteers had been considered a variable beyond management control. The SOD system was established on a volunteer basis assuming a low vacancy rate and thus a minor dependence on overtime. As reliance on overtime has increased due to vacancies, Department

officials have been hesitant to require overtime as needed. Part of the reason for this has been that SOD is paid on a straight-time basis, and mandatory forced overtime might increase the pressure to pay a premium for such work.

However, the Los Angeles County Fire Department "assign hires" (mandatory overtime) firefighters on a regular basis at straight-time overtime pay, and even the City Fire Department frequently assign hires its paramedic personnel on a straight-time overtime basis. There should be no reason why City firefighters cannot be assign hired from time to time when management considers it essential to adequately staff the fire stations.

If the City is eventually required to pay premium wages for overtime work, the financial advantage of the SOD system would essentially be eliminated, thereby probably necessitating a gradual abandonment of SOD and the hiring of additional full-time personnel to cover vacancies. This would be to the disadvantage of both the City in terms of cost, and to the employees who would no longer have the opportunity to work overtime except on a very limited basis. However, field interviews with firefighter personnel indicated that most would prefer to continue the straight-time SOD system as it is now, rather than risk the loss of extensive overtime. If there is general consensus on the point, then the present SOD system, even with periodic assign hires, should be continued. (During the course of this audit, assign hiring was instituted on a regular basis as needed.) As the Department fills its numerous vacant positions during the next year, additional personnel will not only reduce the requirement for assign hires, but will be available to share the overtime workload as well.

Based on the advantages of SOD to both the City and the employees, as a minimum the additional 60 Firefighter positions authorized in the 1977-78 Budget should be deleted, and replaced by additional funding in the Department's overtime account. (See Recommendation No. 1). Beyond that, the proven success of overtime to cover for vacancies as well as absences indicates the possibility of holding some authorized positions vacant. Based upon recent experience whereby SOD on the average constituted roughly one-fourth of the on-duty strength, it is conceivable that a specific vacancy level could be maintained without adverse effect. If the remaining vacancies are filled and the current trend in overtime hiring continues, staffing should

prevail at nearly 100% of the authorized maximum. Savings to the City could amount to \$2.1 million annually in pension and fringe benefit costs. There are other factors to be considered which can materially improve the availability of overtime personnel, and which should be thoroughly tested:

A. Station Duty for Non-firefighting Personnel

During the audit an overwhelming number of headquarters personnel and aides from all ranks requested a change in the personnel ordinance to allow them to work in field station duty positions on a voluntary basis during periods of scheduled time off. The firefighters also stated they would work for the same pay as the position filled.

Under the current system, uniformed personnel assigned to headquarters organizations are not allowed to work in fire company or battalion field assignments. Specifically this applies to those personnel in the Bureau of Fire Prevention (139 positions), Operations Control Division (60 positions), Battalion Officer Aides (54 positions), and Chief Officer Aides (9 positions). Since historically, about 25 percent of the personnel do not participate in voluntary overtime duty, this leaves about 200 firefighting personnel unable to serve in field duty positions on a voluntary basis.

Advantages in allowing field work for headquarters personnel include the fact that most men will eventually return to field duty. By participating in field operations and training, their skill level will be maintained. As previously noted, some stations are under authorized strength on weekends and holidays because field personnel are not voluntarily filling all unfilled positions.

The County Fire Department allows its headquarters Battalion Chiefs and firefighting personnel to fill field station duty positions on a voluntary scheduled overtime basis.

B. Allow Firefighters to work earned vacation time

As a means to improve weekend and holiday staffing levels, firefighters could be allowed to work their earned vacation time. Presently, they must take the time off. The platoon scheduling system is such that they can and do trade shifts so they work up to 96 hours straight, and then have as many as six consecutive days off. Field interviews suggest that such a system allows personnel to accumulate adequate blocks of time off without the need to take vacation time.

C. Weekend Volunteer Overtime

The present overtime system establishes an "opportunity schedule" to assure that all field personnel who wish to work SOD are given an equal chance to do so. Firefighters who volunteer to work overtime on weekends are penalized in that they use their "opportunity" for SOD during the week. From January through June 1977, on a trial basis, weekend volunteer overtime was not charged against a firefighter's opportunity to work overtime on weekdays. This experiment was an attempt to encourage weekend overtime so that a high level of overall staffing could be maintained. We are unaware of the result of the experiment, but consider it to be a viable alternative which deserves further testing.

D. Mandatory Weekend Duty

Firefighters may not take time off, except for illness, if they are scheduled to work on any major holiday. This is a Department regulation intended to hold holiday absences to a minimum due to a lack of overtime volunteers on those days. It is possible that a similar requirement could be established for scheduled weekend duty. There are complications to this alternative in that additional weekday time off would have to be scheduled. However, the potential benefits in terms of maximizing weekend staffing levels warrant consideration.

It is our opinion that the significant benefits of SOD to the City and to Fire Department employees make it a most useful tool in the management of staffing requirements. Even though

the system has been under pressure due to a continuing high vacancy factor, future hiring rates should alleviate concern regarding the volunteer character of overtime, and should encourage management to make the maximum use of its potential. (See Recommendations Nos. 1 and 9).

2. Fire Station Staffing

The number of personnel assigned to fire stations is based on what management considers to be the optimum number of firefighters required to make maximum use of apparatus under the most extreme conditions. Single engine stations are authorized five positions. Task force stations, which have additional apparatus, are authorized 10, 11 or 12 positions depending on their relative emergency workload. Five heavy duty task force stations, located in the City's highly concentrated commercial/industrial areas, are staffed with 17 persons each. Single engine and task force stations are spread throughout the City to provide quick initial response combined with a sizeable backup force for effective firefighting capability.

Several factors were considered in the evaluation of station staffing standards:

• Insurance Services Office (ISO) Grading Schedule

For years a high level of station staffing has been defended as critical to the City's Class 2 Fire Protection Rating. However, the average homeowner receives no direct benefit in terms of reduced insurance rates as a result of a Class 2 rating as opposed to a Class 3 or even a Class 4 rating. Further, the premium savings to commercial/industrial property owners are minor in comparison to the overall cost of fire protection.

Station staffing, of course, is only one of many factors in the Grading Schedule. There were other areas judged deficient when the City was last rated in 1965, which have been or could be improved to offset deficiency points in station staffing. Such tradeoffs should be considered with the objective of achieving a high protection class rating at the least possible cost.

ISO officials interviewed during the audit emphasized that the Grading Schedule should be used only as a guide in

setting fire protection priorities, tempered by local fire protection needs and competing demands on revenue. They explained that too often the Schedule has been referenced as mandatory, and used for leverage to increase fire department budgets without benefit of specific analysis.

In 1976, ISO recommended an average 20 percent increase in fire insurance premiums for commercial/industrial properties, despite the City's high protection class rating. The validity of the Grading Schedule as a measure of protection capability must therefore be called into question. This opens the way for a complete examination of fire station staffing alternatives to provide a continuing high level of service, perhaps at reduced cost. (See discussion under the heading Fire Protection Planning).

• Comparable Staffing in Other Fire Departments

Station staffing policy of other jurisdictions provides a measure of comparison useful in terms of what other cities consider appropriate fire protection. Certainly though, the fire potential and other unique characteristics of each jurisdiction have an impact on staffing requirements. The following information regarding the number of companies and staffing was revealed by an informal survey conducted by the Fire Department staff:

<u>City</u>	<u>Engine Companies</u>		<u>Truck Companies</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Staffing</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Staffing</u>
Alhambra	4	4	2	3
Beverly Hills	4	4	1	5
Burbank	7	3	3	3
Culver City	3	4	1	5
Glendale	9	4	3	4
Inglewood	4	5	1	5
Long Beach	19	4	5	4
Pasadena	8	3	2	3
Santa Monica	5	4	1	5
Los Angeles	56*	5	45	5 or 6

*Does not include engines assigned to task force companies.

In comparison with fire departments nationwide, LAFD is the only major department that staffs every company with a minimum of five firefighters. Other large cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit staff some stations with five and in some cases six firefighters but with only four in areas with less fire potential.

• Backup Support

The total number of personnel and apparatus at a fire scene within a short time of notification is a better measure of protection capability than the number of personnel assigned to a single station. It is important to recognize that LAFD policy requires a first alarm response of the nearest engine company and the nearest task force to any structure fire in a residential area. This means a minimum of 15 firefighters will be dispatched on the first alarm. Structure fires in high value commercial/industrial areas get a first alarm assignment of two task forces, the equivalent of at least 20 firefighters.

Beyond the first alarm assignment, company commanders are trained and encouraged to call for backup support immediately if there is any possibility it will be needed. Additional personnel and equipment can quickly be dispatched to the fire scene.

• Staffing Studies

Several LAFD officers have noted the lack of a valid study to show with certainty the staffing level required for engine and task force stations. A time and motion study was conducted by the Dallas, Texas, Fire Department to examine the relative efficiency of 3, 4 and 5 person engine companies. The results, however, are questionable in that the study did not take into account the impact of multiple units being dispatched to a fire or the discretion used by a fire officer to assign tasks commensurate with available personnel.

The LAFD has recently been conducting its own study of staffing needs for various fire fighting situations. It is impossible, however, to determine the exact level of personnel and equipment needed for a "typical" fire, due to the unique circumstances of each incident. The life hazard and exposure threat varies considerably depending on many factors, especially the extent to which the fire is involved when a first-in company arrives on the scene.

One significant consideration in analyzing staffing needs is the level of resources normally used to extinguish fires, as indicated by a review of past incident reports. One study conducted in San Diego sometime ago revealed that only 7 percent of the fire incidents there were of sufficient severity to require a hose connection to a fire hydrant. The others required staffing in much more limited amounts. In most cases either the fire was out on arrival, or a fire extinguisher or garden hose was sufficient to put out the fire. The Los Angeles County Fire Department has had similar experience in that roughly 95 percent of the incidents require at most a single one-inch hose line to extinguish the fire. Information on the severity of fire incidents in the City is available in LAFD reports, but it apparently has not been fully analyzed. We can speculate, however, that City experience might well be similar to that of the County.

Disagreements in assessing station staffing levels seem to result from differing viewpoints as to whether staffing should be based on maximum potential demand or normal requirements related to actual experience. Los Angeles County staffs engine companies with three or four firefighters. The City staffs with five, yet both are capable of effectively controlling the great percentage of fire incidents. The difference is that LAFD staffs to meet the extremes which require maximum potential use of apparatus, even though such extremes may be realized only infrequently.

• Recent Staffing Reductions

During fiscal 1975-76, night staffing (8 p.m. to 8 a.m.) in the single engine companies was reduced from five to four persons, which represented a reduction of only 6 percent in

on-duty strength. The rationale for this was twofold:

- a) The incidence of fires at night is significantly less than in the daytime.
- b) Single engine stations already operate with only four personnel during the day because of fire prevention and other details which make one firefighter generally unavailable for suppression duty.

This experiment was terminated after a one-year trial period. Union officials claimed that the personnel reductions resulted in more fire deaths and more greater alarm fires where insufficient staffing was available to effectively handle fire incidents. There has been no objective analysis of the impact on fire losses, although LAFD management did indicate, "we don't know of any fire deaths which were caused by the fact that there were four firefighters on a single-engine company as compared to five." Unfortunately, the Department made no on-going analysis of experience during the experiment to see if there were resulting adverse effects.

It is important to note that task force stations, which are more heavily staffed than single engine companies, were not reduced in strength during the 1975-76 experiment. The same reduction in overall strength might have been achieved by cutting task force and heavy duty task force stations to a minimum at night (10 and 15 respectively), with a potentially lesser impact on firefighting capability. Whereas a one-position cut from a single engine station represents a 20 percent reduction, even a two-position cut from a 12 or 15 man task force leaves a relatively large firefighting force. Furthermore, it would still be possible to operate the equipment assigned to task forces if such reductions were made.

Recently, the Department has been running an average of 20 firefighters short of authorized strength each shift. The necessity for this is based on the funding reduction of one million dollars in constant manning overtime to offset the addition of the 60 new Firefighter positions in the 1977-78 Budget as previously described. Again, however, there has been no formal evaluation of the impact on firefighting capability.

Reduced staffing in 1975-76 and even now has apparently not caused what can be judged as serious tactical deficiencies. The concern seems to be over potential problems rather than actual experience to date.

• Variable Demand

The Department has traditionally attempted to maintain a constant level of staffing at each station, regardless of a recognized variable demand in terms of both potential and actual fire incidents.

Stations in the brush and grass fire areas of the City require a full staffing complement during the brush and grass fire season, but could be reduced in strength at other times of the year. Grass fire incidents responded to by several of these stations amount to more than half of their annual workload.

The incidence of fire on the average is some 30 percent to 40 percent less during the night hours (8 p.m. - 8 a.m.) than during the day. Selective staffing reductions could be supported in areas which have the fewest structure fires at night.

For stations in the downtown area, which have backup support in close proximity, the staffing level is less critical than for those in outlying areas with backup support further removed. Staffing levels downtown, especially in heavy duty task force stations could be reduced given the ample availability of backup support.

The City of San Francisco varies both engine and truck staffing based on the fire potential of residential vs. commercial/industrial areas. The City of Los Angeles could support staffing reductions based on such variable potential rather than staffing all engine companies alike.

Overall, it is apparent that a variable staffing system can be developed based on known factors of fire incidence by type, season and time of day, considering available backup support, fire potential and other special needs of different areas in the City. More emphasis must be given to staffing

based on fire experience. Rather than full staffing at all times to meet the extreme fire potential, variable staffing with well organized backup support can allow the Department to maintain its high level of service with a capability to meet extraordinary demands on an exception basis.

The Department should, on a trial basis over at least a one year period beginning September 1, 1978, implement the concept of variable staffing. It should be based on staff analysis and input from field commanders as to the most appropriate areas for testing. Both single engine and task force stations should be included. Tactical experience in reduced staffing situations should be closely monitored. The Chief Engineer has indicated that specific plans are being developed at this time to initiate a variable staffing approach.

The net result of a successful variable staffing program is a conservation of staffing resources. If, for instance, all task force stations were reduced to minimum strength at night, a surplus equivalent to 33 positions each day worth approximately two million dollars annually could be achieved. The personnel surplus at night could be applied to a more intensive fire prevention program during the day, assuming that a worthwhile, fully productive fire prevention program could be developed; or to the replacement of civilian paramedic personnel with firefighter paramedics as proposed elsewhere in this report. Although these potential economies are significant, a minimum of 15 firefighters would still respond on first alarm to night structure fires in residential areas. (See Recommendation No. 3).

3. Alternative Shift Scheduling

Fire Station personnel are on duty an average of 56 hours per week on a three platoon system consisting of 24-hour shifts. This work schedule is the most prevalent among fire departments in large U.S. cities (over 450,000 population). However, union demands for higher wages and fringe benefits, coupled with growing pressure in some parts of the country for a reduced work week have led some fire departments to experiment with alternate shift schedules of less than 24 hours.

The most common variant of the 24-hour duty period is the "10-14" or "9-15" system whereby the basic 24-hour shift is

broken into two parts, a day shift and a night shift. Shifts are split so that firefighters do not work 24 hours consecutively. A 1977 Philadelphia study identified nine major fire departments using either the 10-14 or 9-15 system. All but one have an average duty week of 48 hours or less, as follows:

<u>City</u>	<u>Hours Per Shift</u>	<u>Average Hours Per Week</u>
Baltimore	10-14	48
Boston	10-14	42
Buffalo	9-15	40
Houston	10-14	54
New York	9-15	40
Philadelphia	10-14	42
Pittsburg	10-14	42
Seattle	10-14	45.7
Washington, D.C.	10-14	48

By splitting the duty period in two, it is possible to use the night shift for training, station maintenance, and other productive activities. Theoretically, if sleeping time is eliminated during the night shift, overall productive time can be increased by roughly one third. However, we are unaware of the extent to which the departments using the 10-14 or 9-15 system actually make use of the additional productive time available.

LAFD considered the potential of a 10-14 system in 1974 when the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was expected to become applicable to fire departments. Under the Act, over a period of several years the average work week for firefighters would be mandatorily reduced. To compensate for the increase in personnel that a work week reduction would necessitate, LAFD management outlined a proposal for a 10-14 schedule which would eliminate sleeping time completely. Night duty hours would be used for station and apparatus maintenance, hose changes, ladder maintenance, drills, report preparation and record keeping. More daytime hours would therefore be available for fire prevention. No further effort has been made to refine the 10-14 plan, since the pressure of FLSA has been dropped.

A more extreme deviation from the 24-hour fire duty period is the 8-hour day, 40-hour work week which was implemented in the Kansas City, Missouri, fire department in May, 1977.

Theoretically, productivity is increased by bringing on fresh crews every 8 hours and assigning work related duties to each shift in place of standby and sleeping time. Assuming however, that present station staffing levels were to be maintained, personnel requirements would increase by roughly 40%.

Field interviews conducted in the course of this audit indicate that LAFD firefighters are very much tied to the present 24-hour platoon duty schedule. Their life styles are developed around it, and their driving distances from home to work are such that a change to a 10-14 system, and especially an 8 hour day, 40-hour week, would be quite disruptive.

It is apparent that alternative shift schedules have been implemented elsewhere in the country largely as a result of union demands for a shorter work week. Such has not been the case to any great extent in Los Angeles. Any consideration to deviate from the 24-hour platoon duty schedule in LAFD must be based upon a well thought out plan for making use of the resultant additional productive time. So far as we are aware, there is presently sufficient time available to accomplish all assigned tasks.

The cost implications of a change in shift schedules is a particular concern. Cost of additional personnel must be offset by some form of variable staffing, a concept which has not yet been accepted from a City policy standpoint.

Overall, the present 24-hour duty schedule seems quite satisfactory from an optimum cost/benefit point of view.

4. Civilianization Potential

During the Audit a number of firefighters were observed in a variety of non-firefighting functions which do not appear to fully utilize the special skills, ability, training and experience attributable to firefighters. Because of the higher pay scale and fringe benefits provided to firefighters, this practice greatly increases the cost of fire protection to the citizens and results in a non-efficient use of personnel. Consideration should be given to civilianizing a number of these positions by phasing in appropriate classifications in accordance with a specific plan designed to minimize disruption.

Many firefighters who eventually fill headquarters assignments do so with the understanding that they will return to fire suppression duties when their 18 month to two year assignment is completed. This short term rotation may hinder the retention of experienced personnel in special knowledge functions which in many cases require about two years to learn. Civilianizing positions in training, specialized fire prevention, legal liaison, and fire research could provide a longer retention of experience in these specialized knowledge areas.

In 1972, approximately 20 positions in the Engineering and Research Section, Bureau of Fire Prevention, were identified for conversion from uniformed to civilian classifications trained in the field of professional Fire Protection Engineering. However, the Department has had but limited success in filling the positions and currently only two civilians are employed. The Department should accelerate this conversion to obtain the benefits of civilianization.

The following table lists a series of positions now occupied by firefighters which are identified for potential civilianization. There may be additional positions beyond those listed, and some identified may prove not to be valid candidates after detailed feasibility studies are made.

A. Previously Identified for Civilianization by Fire Department in 1972

<u>Number of Positions</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Organizational Section/Unit</u>
1	Engineering and Research Section Head	Engineering and Research Section
8	New Construction Plan Checking	Building Standards Unit
6	Researching technical aspects of fire technology	Research Unit
5	Processes fire permits and Fire Code variances	Engineering and Hydrant Unit
<u>20</u>		

B. Identified by Audit Team for Possible Civilianization

<u>Number of Positions</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Organizational Section/Unit</u>
4	New construction inspection	Industrial, Commercial, and Public Safety Sections
6	Legal liaison with City Attorney on hearings and court cases	Engineering and Hydrant Unit
2	Research and analyze special problems as directed by Fire Chief	Planning Section
11	Make water drops, lay lines, provide general helicopter service	Helicopter Company
3	Fire supplies warehousing, equipment maintenance	Supply and Maintenance Division
6	Safety program, workers compensation administration, welfare	Medical Liaison Unit
54	Receive calls for service, dispatches men and equipment	Operations Control Division
2	Training Officer	Training Section
<u>88</u>		
<u>108</u>		

The financial aspects of civilianization are realistically presented in a publication titled, Alternatives to

Traditional Public Safety Delivery Systems, published by the Institute for Local Self-Government, Berkeley, California, 1977. The report refers to areas of civilianization implemented by other fire departments including fire prevention and instruction, communications, dispatching, research and record keeping.

Lately, the Department has experienced problems in filling new construction Fire Inspector vacancies because new firefighters lack sufficient construction technology background. Although these inspectors are not charged with the responsibility to determine Building Code compliance with structural requirements, but rather to check fire protection systems in new structures, a basic knowledge of construction technology is considered essential. Some recently appointed construction inspectors are trying to improve their knowledge in the field by attending evening classes. It requires an estimated two-and-one-half years for an average Fire Inspector to become a proficient new construction inspector. Fire Inspectors who have prior construction experience are sought for these positions.

Many Fire Inspectors, including new construction inspectors, expect to stay in the Bureau of Fire Prevention for approximately two years before rotational assignment to the Bureau of Fire Suppression. Because of the long time investment to train Fire Inspectors to become proficient as new construction specialists, it seems more logical that these positions should be staffed by civilians who follow the construction technology career path.

The Fire Department has identified 248 non-firefighting sworn positions in which injured firefighters could be placed. As of November, 1977, approximately 28 injured firefighters who require "permanent and stationary" duty were assigned to restricted status in non-firefighter positions. Obviously, the civilianization effort suggested herein would not result in an inadequate number of positions remaining for temporarily injured personnel.

The approach recommended for further civilianization of the Department should be similar to that used in civilianizing the Engineering and Research Section of the Fire Prevention Bureau. Detailed studies were made of the duties and salaries to determine the feasibility of civilianizing those positions. (See Recommendation No. 10).

5. Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service

The Fire Department provides emergency medical and ambulance service throughout the City. Most ambulances are staffed with civilians who are trained and certified as Paramedics by the County of Los Angeles, but some are staffed with civilians trained as Emergency Medical Technicians I. There are also some backup ambulances staffed with firefighters.

Prior to 1970, the Fire Department operated ambulances in the San Fernando Valley, Highland Park, Watts and Harbor areas which were manned with firefighters. In 1970, civilian ambulance personnel were transferred to the Fire Department from the Receiving Hospital Department in order to provide improved supervision and dispatching of ambulances in the remainder of the City. Subsequently, all ambulance positions were civilianized to provide uniformity.

The civilians have performed their work very well. However, in recent years several factors have arisen which pose the question as to whether civilians should continue to be used on ambulances. The salary of civilian paramedics has increased to the point where the average salary for the class of Ambulance Attendant is higher than that for Firefighter, and there have been proposals that the City provide civilian ambulance personnel with more promotional opportunity and with retirement benefits comparable to firefighters. Even more important, implementation of the task force method of operation in fire suppression has made the use of firefighters more flexible.

We believe that existing firefighter positions can be used to provide emergency medical and paramedic ambulance service throughout most of the City, thus permitting the gradual reduction of civilian ambulance personnel through attrition. This can be accomplished by using firefighter positions now assigned to task force and heavy duty task force stations, and positions made available by implementation of the variable staffing concept described elsewhere in this report. Phasing out the civilian ambulance staff would eventually result in the elimination of many positions through attrition with an annual saving potential of several millions of dollars. The use of firefighters to staff ambulance units would also make it possible to expand service in the City.

The County of Los Angeles, the City of Long Beach, and many other jurisdictions staff their paramedic units with firefighters. Paramedic units operated by the County of Los Angeles are dispatched to structure fires with the regular fire apparatus and the paramedic firefighters are then able to provide either paramedic, rescue or firefighting assistance. We do not suggest that the paramedic units should respond to every fire in the City of Los Angeles, but in those cases where they would respond the additional capability would exist because of the firefighter paramedics.

It is suggested that the Fire Department undertake a pilot program to test the feasibility of using firefighters to operate paramedic ambulances. A sufficient number of firefighters will have to be trained as paramedics so that there will be at least two paramedics on each shift at each station selected for the pilot program.

Eventually, it would appear desirable to train sufficient firefighters as paramedics so that regular firefighting apparatus could be equipped with paramedic equipment and used to respond in situations when nearby ambulances are not available for immediate response. This capability would also be of importance in time of major disaster. (See Recommendation No. 5).

A study was commissioned by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors in December, 1974, to evaluate emergency ambulance services in Los Angeles County and study alternative approaches for meeting countywide obligations to provide adequate field emergency medical services in both incorporated and unincorporated areas. The consultant recommended in June, 1976, that major organizational and operational changes should occur to achieve uniformity in the delivery of emergency medical services in the County by 1980. This report is now being reviewed by a special committee created by the Board. Preliminary indications are that many significant obstacles would have to be overcome before a single countywide ambulance service could be established.

6. Competitive Sports Injuries

In 1971, a Department-wide, mandatory physical fitness program was initiated. It requires every on-duty member in the Department to engage in prescribed physical fitness exercises each day he is on duty, unless excused by a doctor. The exercise

program primarily consists of one hour of calisthenics three days per week. This program includes warm-up and flexibility exercises, cardiovascular activity, and conditioning exercises.

The Fire Department's Manual of Operations states "members are permitted and encouraged to participate in approved athletic activities as an adjunct to the physical fitness program." Among the approved athletic activities are the competitive sports of handball, raquetball, and volleyball. The Manual further states that "athletic activities such as volleyball, raquetball, handball, or basketball are an adjunct to, but will not be substituted for the Department physical fitness program."

Off-duty athletic activity is allowed upon specific approval of the Department. This includes such exercises as running, cycling, walking, and swimming. Injuries incurred while engaged in approved off-duty athletic activities are currently declared injuries-on-duty. (See Recommendation No. 14).

A recent Fire Department study indicates that total medical costs, caused by volleyball, racquetball, and handball injuries, including costs to replace injured persons, were approximately \$341,000 in fiscal year 1976-77. In calendar year 1975-76 racquetball, volleyball, and handball ranked fourth, sixth, and tenth respectively in the ranking of the top ten injury producing activities in the Department. The ten activities which resulted in the greatest number of injuries in the Department in 1976 were: 1) Activity Necessary (General), 2) Hose handling (Emergency), 3) Exercising, 4) Racquetball, 5) Line Advancing, 6) Volleyball, 7) Get on/off apparatus, 8) Ladder raise/lower, 9) Hose handling (non-emergency), 10) Handball.

Since the cost of injuries due to handball, racquetball, and volleyball is at such a high figure and these activities are controllable, their exclusion from the approved athletic activities should reduce this major cost to the City. Department approved cardiovascular exercises, which may be performed in place of competitive sports, include stationary running, bench stepping, rope skipping, stationary bicycling, running, jogging and walking. (See Recommendation No. 13).

Many of the existing fire stations have handball courts. The new stations to be constructed will have "exercise rooms" measuring approximately 20 feet by 40 feet, which, with some

modification could be used to play handball, racquetball and volleyball. Existing handball courts should be converted to exercise areas for prescribed exercises and activities that are relatively injury free.

FIRE PROTECTION PLANNING

Historically, fire protection planning in the City has been dominated by insurance industry standards for water supply, fire station locations, staffing and apparatus. The City has closely adhered to these standards as set forth in the Insurance Service Office's (ISO) Grading Schedule for Municipal Fire Protection, and as a result has been assigned an overall fire protection Class 2 rating, among the best nation-wide. As part of that overall evaluation, the Fire Department has consistently attained the highest ratings among major cities (500,000 population). This protection class rating has been a factor used by underwriters in setting fire insurance rates.

Despite the City's high rating, there has been a growing awareness among Fire Department officials of the need to define a fire protection service level based on local concerns and priorities rather than standards set by the insurance industry. There are several reasons for this initiative.

1. Fire Prevention - The Grading Schedule emphasizes fire fighting aspects of protection, but gives only minor consideration to fire prevention through inspections and code requirements. Fire departments over the years have concentrated on building the capability of their suppression forces as the primary component of fire protection. This has been partially in response to emphasis of the Grading Schedule on suppression, and also because the "average" firefighter has looked upon fire fighting as the most important part of his job. More recently, however, fire officials have begun to recognize prevention as an equally important factor in overall fire protection planning. Prevention is a means of controlling fire threats before they get out of hand. More emphasis on fire safety education and on periodic inspections of buildings to insure strict compliance with fire and building code requirements could significantly reduce life and property loss from fires. LAFD management is now directing a major effort toward the objective of making fire prevention at least equal to suppression in the planning of Department priorities, consistent with the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control recommendation previously referenced.

2. Planning Data - The dominance of insurance industry standards over fire protection planning in the City has been a factor in the minimal data collection and analysis undertaken by the LAFD to independently project service levels and priorities. In order to hold down insurance costs the City has concentrated on meeting ISO standards as the basis for justifying new fire stations and staffing levels. We have assumed that a good insurance rating equates to a high level of fire protection. A highly rated Fire Department has minimized the necessity for validation data.

As the Fire Department management now recognizes the need to test these traditional standards in light of improved technology, changing land use patterns and continuing budget constraints, the lack of sufficient data for analysis has become apparent. Key baseline data for evaluation such as fire incident response times, the severity of alarms and the value of fire losses is not readily available. The Department is presently establishing data requirements for an improved information system. (See related discussion in this report under the heading Management Information System).

3. Cost of Service - As the cost of fire protection continues to increase with inflation, improved firefighter salaries and fringe benefits, more attention must be focused on the cost effectiveness of fire operations. A highly rated Fire Department or a Class 2 City rating can no longer be the sole criteria for judging management capability.

The funding of Fire Districts in Los Angeles County, which does not include emergency medical service and certain items of firefighting equipment, is limited by State law whereby expenditures in fiscal 1977-78 equal 78 cents per \$100 of assessed valuation. By comparison, the City in fiscal 1976-77 budgeted \$1.36 per \$100 assessed valuation for fire and rescue service. The difference in expenditures is based in large part on the relative station locations and staffing levels, and although a direct comparison between the two may not be completely appropriate, the cost variation to some extent is represented by the City's policy of maintaining a top flight Fire Department.

There is considerable doubt as to the value of a Class 2 City rating on fire insurance rates for homeowners. ISO has indicated that rates for fire policies on dwellings are

unaffected by an advance in class from 3 to 2, although commercial/industrial policies would benefit to some extent. The question then arises regarding the reason for homeowners subsidizing fire insurance premiums for commercial/industrial property by paying the cost of Class 2 fire protection. Fire protection improvements must be justified based on the degree to which they reduce life and property losses from fire.

4. Premium/Loss Basis for Insurance Rates - In 1976, City officials expected the City to be reevaluated by ISO in terms of its fire protection classification. Based on improvements since the City was last rated in 1965, an improvement in rating points was anticipated. On the contrary however, ISO did not reevaluate the City's rating but instead recommended a 20% increase in fire insurance rates based on an indicated 66% increase due to excessive fire losses over the previous five years. The Mayor has established a special task force to study the equity of the ISO recommendations and the validity of data from which its conclusions were drawn. Certainly though, the credibility of the entire rating schedule as an indicator of fire protection quality is in doubt, which further necessitates a new look at fire protection problems and service levels in the City based on local policies and priorities.

The 1973 "America Burning" report recommended "that every local fire jurisdiction prepare a master plan designed to meet the community's present and future needs in fire protection, to serve as a basis for program budgeting, and to identify and implement the optimum cost-benefit solutions in fire protection." Recently, a Fire Prevention and Control Master Planning Guide was prepared for the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration. LAFD officials participated in its development. The Guide details a step-by-step planning process which is a systematic method of identifying the fire situation and service objectives within a community, and then defining alternative measures for the most cost/effective fire protection.

The planning process could provide the City an opportunity for a fresh, objective review of all fire protection planning factors, independent of insurance industry standards. Methods of calculating manpower and equipment levels, response times, work scheduling and fire prevention requirements could be thoroughly reevaluated. The goal is to maintain and improve service where possible while holding or reducing costs.

Department personnel are already making an effort to develop information regarding the nature of the fire problem within battalions throughout the City. This is an important first effort upon which to begin building a data base. Improvements to the fire information system must be made to accurately identify current levels of protection and specific problem areas.

A formal fire protection master planning effort should be initiated on a pilot basis to test the validity of the process and evaluate the results as they affect service level and cost. The Fire Protection Element of the City's General Plan presents a series of overall policy guidelines to be considered at the outset of this in-depth analysis of community service needs. There are 18 battalions in the City which can be designated as fire management areas for testing alternative service techniques. If the formal planning process proves to be useful it can be expanded gradually throughout the City. (See Recommendation No. 4).

Harbor Fire Protection

In the last few years, conflicts have arisen between the City Council and the Harbor Department over payment for Harbor fire protection services. The most recent conflict occurred in November, 1977, when the Harbor Department withdrew a \$30 million bond issue which was to be used to initially finance a five-year capital improvement program.

There is disagreement between the Harbor Department and the Fire Department as to the level of fire protection services required.

Members of the Audit Team interviewed the General Manager of the Harbor Department regarding his concern for fire protection services in the Port. His concern relates to the need to explore alternatives for fire protection services and to jointly plan for such services with the Fire Department.

According to the General Manager, the Port has changed over the years and is continuing to change, and fire risks are being reduced. Cited as examples were the addition of new sprinkler systems in warehouses, the removal of many wooden warehouses, the elimination of wooden piling, and the general

changes in the manner by which goods are transported through the Port (containerization).

Other major ports are using commercial tug-boats with fire fighting equipment to assist in fire protection. Alternatively, it was suggested the current Port Police boats could be converted to provide some fire protection capability. The Harbor has 55 personnel in the Port Security function along with three boats.

One large Harbor operator has purchased a fire engine with foam capability for its own use. The City Fire Department is providing training for its use.

The General Manager indicated that he would like the Harbor Department to directly assist in the development of the fire protection plan of the Port. This request seems to be valid in light of the commitment of Fire Department management to the concept of master planning for fire protection. Fire Department management has also indicated a willingness to work cooperatively with the Harbor Department toward a mutually agreeable solution. Preliminary discussions have already begun. (See Recommendation No. 4).

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

In expressing current issues and concerns affecting the Fire Department, the Chief Engineer made a strong statement in favor of a Management Information System to support Fire Department management. As described by the Chief Engineer, the system should address computerized building fire safety evaluation; have an element for modeling manpower and apparatus deployment; and provide an interface between injury statistics, fire activity, fire prevention activity, training, and all of the other activities of the Department so as to evaluate the impact of changing any particular element.

The Department has several existing systems which provide statistical data on several major departmental activities, but there exists no rapid uniform information gathering and report producing data system to assist management personnel in the decision making process. The Department envisions one comprehensive coordinated data retrieval system to access all proprietary data files to assist management in planning for present and future goals and objectives.

Some of the independently operated existing systems are:

1. Fire Command and Control System
2. Fire Prevention Bureau Activity Reporting System
3. Fire Vehicle and Maintenance Costs System
4. Interim Statistical Reporting System
5. Workmen's Compensation/Safety System

These systems are decentralized in terms of responsibility for management and operations. They should be centralized in a permanent systems group within the Department's Planning Section. The Planning Section is the logical place for this effort because it fits in with the research and analysis efforts that Section is engaged in, and the Section also has the immediate support and attention of the Chief Engineer.

Because of the transient nature of firefighters assigned to staff positions, the systems group should be headed by and largely staffed with civilians with backgrounds in systems analysis, operations research, and information systems analysis. This knowledge is necessary in order to develop and analyze those information systems which provide the vast amount of analytical data required for management decision making.

The Department has submitted a 1978-79 data processing system request for the development of a master plan for management information systems. The Audit Team supports the Department in the need to establish a long-range master plan for the data processing systems in the Department. The plan would assign priorities to Department needs for new systems and modifications to existing systems, and provide a framework for technical compatibility.

The Department has also requested data processing services to implement a new source document for reporting fire incidents. The new system would replace the interim statistical reporting system with a modified version of one used by the National Fire Protection and Control Agency.

The purpose of the change is to provide the Fire Department with more complete information not reported on the current forms, such as the length of time required to arrive at the scene of an incident, the length of time required to bring a fire under control, the number of employee hours used on an incident, and the location of the incident by census tract. This information as well as other data items will more closely tie fire prevention efforts to the types and locations of fires.

The concerns and needs for a Management Information System in the Fire Department are fully acknowledged and described in greater detail in the proposed Integrated Systems Plan of the City. This plan provides the methodology for the orderly development of information systems which identify and incorporate City departmental management needs into an overall City information system. This methodology should provide the most feasible design of interrelating departmental information systems.

The Department should emphasize the development of a systems staff and the establishment of a master plan for the development of fire information systems. This effort should be

coordinated with the partial civilianization of the Planning Section as suggested elsewhere in this report. (See Recommendation No. 11).

CODE ENFORCEMENT

A Charter responsibility of the Fire Department is to enforce all ordinances and laws relating to the prevention or spreading of fires, and all ordinances and laws pertaining to fire control and fire hazards within the City. One means by which the Department carries out these responsibilities is through the enforcement of the Los Angeles Fire Code. The Fire Code prescribes laws for the safeguarding of life and property from fire or panic which may arise from the use or occupancy of buildings or premises. The fire and life safety provisions contained in the Fire Code are enforced primarily by firefighters and Fire Inspectors through periodic inspections of industrial and commercial structures, health care facilities, and churches, schools, and other places of public assemblage.

In addition, the Fire Department is responsible for enforcing the Regulations of the State Fire Marshal as set forth in Title 19 of the California Administrative Code (CAC). The regulations in Title 19 constitute the basic building design and construction standards of the State Fire Marshal.

The Department of Building and Safety has the Charter responsibility for enforcing all laws relating to the construction, alteration, and repair of buildings or structures in the City, and to the installation, alteration, repair, use and operation of all heating, plumbing, lighting, ventilating, refrigerating, electrical and mechanical appliances and equipment therein. The Department staff carries out this responsibility by enforcing the provisions of the Los Angeles Building, Electrical, Plumbing, and Mechanical Codes. Under provisions of Section 98.0403 1(d) of the Municipal Code, Building and Safety is also responsible for enforcing the Regulations of the State Fire Marshal which relate to the construction, alteration and repair of buildings or structures,....etc., provided that no modifications are granted unless first submitted to the Chief Engineer of the Fire Department for report and recommendation with respect thereto.

There is significant overlapping of both the Charter responsibilities and the code provisions which are to be enforced by these two City departments. This situation results in an apparent duplication of work effort in that personnel from both the Fire Department and Building and Safety are involved in

reviewing building plans and conducting on-site inspections during construction, alteration, and repair of many buildings in the City. Although there is a good working relationship between the City departments involved, customers are often inconvenienced because they must have their plans approved and construction sites inspected by personnel from two City departments. The salary cost to the City is obviously higher than if the work were performed by a single department.

At the present time, those portions of construction plans which pertain to the use and operation of all heating, plumbing, lighting, ventilating, refrigerating, electrical and mechanical appliances located in buildings or structures are plan checked by Building and Safety personnel only, and not by Fire Department personnel, because LAFD currently does not employ engineers qualified to perform this work. The requirements of the Los Angeles Electrical, Plumbing, and Mechanical Codes, and the requirements of Title 19 CAC are incorporated into the plans.

In the case of similar code provisions, the code with the most restrictive provisions is applied. The mechanical and electrical engineers in Building and Safety who perform these plan check functions consult with LAFD personnel regarding fire safety provisions whenever necessary, and no variances of Title 19 provisions are granted unless Fire Department approval is obtained. This arrangement between the two departments has been operating satisfactorily for many years.

A different situation exists in the case of plans relating to the construction, alteration, and repair of buildings or structures where the building codes are involved, and this is essentially where the duplication of work between the two departments occurs. In this instance, the Fire Department has trained some of its uniformed personnel to review building plans and to inspect buildings during construction to comply with the State's Title 19 requirements. The Department also checks plans and performs construction inspections for many buildings which are not Title 19 occupancies. The current practice is to check plans for construction, alteration, and repair work on all buildings except for one and two family residences. Building and Safety issues all building permits, and must thoroughly check all plans and make construction inspections in connection with the permits. Building and Safety is responsible for enforcing provisions of the Los Angeles Building Code, and the Fire

Department is responsible for enforcing provisions of Title 19 and the Los Angeles Fire Code.

Although it was not always the case, the current requirements of the Los Angeles Building Code and those of Title 19 CAC are very similar. Title 19 includes by reference numerous provisions of the Uniform Building Code (UBC). Many of the requirements of the Los Angeles Building Code and UBC pertaining to fire separations, construction requirements, exits, corridors and openings, interior finishes and flameproofing, and other matters are identical. Whenever either Title 19 or the City's Building Code is more restrictive, the more restrictive code provisions must be adhered to by builders in the City.

Since the State Fire Marshal's design and construction standards set forth in Title 19 CAC are nearly the same now as those in the Los Angeles Building Code, it would be less costly for the City and more convenient for the public if the City could provide for singular administrative control and enforcement of all building and fire codes by one agency during the period in which new buildings are being designed and constructed. The Management Audit Team is of the opinion that if this were done, this singular control should be vested in the Department of Building and Safety. That Department is concerned with all matters relating to building design and construction. It has the required professional engineering and building inspection expertise, and has decentralized public counters throughout the City to accommodate the public.

We are not recommending the assumption of all plan check and construction inspection duties by Building and Safety at this time, but believe that some action should be taken to minimize the present duplication of work in this area. Since under current State law, the provisions of Title 19 CAC are to be enforced by city fire chiefs, the Chief Engineer should continue to enforce Title 19 as he sees fit. It is suggested however, that representatives of the respective departments jointly review current practices and develop improved procedures which will minimize the duplication of plan checking and construction inspection duties. As an example, many identical fire safety requirements currently appear on both the Building and Safety and the Fire Department plan correction sheets. Consolidation of these routine items into Building and Safety's correction sheets would reduce the duplication of work by City employees and provide better service to the public.

The elimination of this outright duplication of work does not suggest abdication of any of the prerogatives of the Fire Department pertaining to code enforcement. It is believed that working arrangements can be developed which will provide for elimination of the duplication of work to the greatest extent possible and still provide for necessary monitoring and control by the Fire Department during the plan approval and construction phases to ensure that its code enforcement objectives are achieved.

Perhaps further research should be conducted regarding the current State law. We question whether it is actually the intent of the State Fire Marshal to require an outright duplication of many of the routine plan check and construction inspection duties by the fire departments in major cities which also have outstanding building departments with well qualified professional engineering and inspection personnel performing these same duties in connection with their day-to-day departmental responsibilities.

When Fire Department personnel review building plans, Title 19 occupancies are checked quite thoroughly, but for other types of commercial or residential buildings, only a perfunctory check of a few items is made. On non-Title 19 occupancies, Building and Safety's plan checks of the life and fire safety items are much more thorough than the plan checks made by the Fire Department. It was also noted that the number of building plans checked for Title 19 requirements is quite small in comparison to the total plans checked by the Department. In fiscal year 1975-76, for example, only 207 permits were issued on Title 19 occupancies but the Fire Department performed a total of 3,611 plan checks for structures.

Due to the minimal degree of involvement by LAFD in plan checking non-Title 19 structures, it is suggested that arrangements be made with Building and Safety to incorporate whatever unique requirements the Fire Department has for non-Title 19 occupancies into Building and Safety's plan correction sheets, and add a few minor requirements to the Los Angeles Building Code if necessary, and that further routine formalized plan checking of non-Title 19 occupancies by the Fire Department be discontinued. Here again, procedural arrangements should be jointly developed to provide for input by the Fire Department into the plan checking process when necessary, including determination of hazardous occupancies, and other requirements

deemed advisable by the Chief Engineer. Recommendation No. 6 relates to improving the efficiency of code enforcement work in the City.

TRACTOR COMPANY

The Tractor Company is responsible for maintaining fireroads and firebreaks in the City and for providing assistance in fighting brush fires and certain types of structural fires where tractors or skip loaders are required. It is staffed with one Captain, nine Firefighters on platoon duty, and three civilians.

The County Fire Department also has a tractor unit and discussion with the management of that Department indicates that the County unit could assume a major portion, if not all, of the work performed by the City Tractor Company. Since the County Tractor Unit is financed with County General Funds, it is believed that most of the work could be done at no cost to the City. The County Fire Department suggests that the City and County Fire Departments undertake a study to determine exactly what services could be provided by the County and what reimbursement, if any, the County would require.

If it should be determined that it is necessary to retain the City tractors and skiploaders solely for use in major fire situations where the County equipment might not be available or sufficient, then it is suggested that instead of having City Firefighters assigned exclusively for these infrequent situations that the personnel be assigned to other units or activities and then released for tractor operations when needed. (See Recommendation No. 7).

HELICOPTER COMPANY

The Helicopter Company has five helicopters in operation and has recently acquired four large surplus craft from the Federal government which it plans to rebuild. The unit is staffed with one Captain and 10 pilots (Firefighter II positions). Nine of the pilots are currently on platoon duty.

A sample of flight logs and discussion with helicopter personnel indicates that the Helicopter Company could assume much of the transportation of personnel from other City departments now provided by Bureau of Transportation helicopters. In fact, the Fire Department did provide much of this service prior to the time the Bureau of Transportation acquired its equipment.

The Bureau of Transportation has four helicopters and three full-time pilots. A reduction in this operation could result in substantial savings to the City.

Based on our observations and the statements of Fire Department helicopter personnel, there is a need for a functional review of helicopter operations of City departments with concentration of emphasis on the availability and usage of aircraft and personnel. It is the intention of this Office to conduct such a functional review at a later date.

TRAINING

Except for Recruit Training, taught by Captains temporarily withdrawn from field duty, "Company Officer Management and Operations" taught by field Battalion Chiefs, and "Captains' Instructor Training" also taught by field Battalion Chiefs, the Fire Department's training program is almost entirely conducted at Company level, using training outlines and aids made available from the Training Section of the Bureau of Support Services.

The Training Section's responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities are too limited in scope to permit a centrally established, monitored and evaluated training program. The Training Section does not conduct training for the Department, does not monitor or evaluate continuous station training activities, those responsibilities having been assigned to the Operations Bureau. Further, the Training Section's uniformed staff is transitory, with assignments of one Battalion Chief and four Captains on an 18-24 month basis. The staffing practices used are not conducive to developing the capability or credibility to achieve or exercise much influence within the Department. While the current uniformed staff is enthusiastic and competent, they are assigned to Training for career development purposes and their primary interests are not in long-term training activities, nor are they likely to remain long enough to gain much expertise in the field.

In a positive effort, the staff has developed a proposal for extensive use of videotape to enhance training at Company level, and has prepared a proposed inventory of management training needs for Chief Officers, and has developed a proposal for a fire simulator training aid. There is not at this time, however, a program for training Captains to perform in Chief Officer ranks. We are advised that of the 3,070 uniformed personnel authorized, approximately 30 have earned Bachelors degrees and approximately 300 have earned Associate degrees. The Chief Engineer has directed that increased emphasis be placed on the importance of formal education for members of the Fire Department, and the Training Section has prepared a program for consideration. We are further advised that the program would include identification of the types and level of education desirable for various officer levels of the Department.

The Fire Department's primary functions are fire prevention, rescue, and fire suppression and while the majority of Fire Department resources must be available for fire suppression work, it is commonly accepted that the greatest inroads on the incidence of fire may be made through an extensive and enthusiastic fire prevention program, particularly a program directed to reducing the likelihood of fire in single family and multiple dwelling places. Such a program should include increased public education efforts through the communication media, but should also feature increased personal contact.

Indications are that firefighters believe they are well trained to fight fires, but that they are inadequately trained to conduct fire prevention inspections. It is also evident that firefighters are simply not as motivated toward fire prevention activities as they are toward fire suppression, yet the majority of the Department's fire prevention inspections are conducted by fire suppression staff at Company level, not by Fire Inspectors. Fire prevention is initially taught during Recruit Training, with 19 hours devoted to the subject during the 10 week course. Thereafter, fire prevention training is taught at Company level by Captains, using the 26 lesson plans included in the Departmental Fire Prevention Manual.

So long as the Fire Department operates on a 24-hour platoon duty basis, training can most conveniently be given at Company or Battalion level, particularly that training which involves equipment and apparatus operations and usage. Recognizing that, in general, Fire Captains are highly motivated and conscientiously attempt to train their companies, we believe the Fire Department's training program should recognize that certain key areas of training should be taught with a view to enhance the quality and uniformity of training, particularly for such key major areas as recruit training, officer training, management training for Chief Officers, and fire prevention training. Further, there should be a capability and authority for central monitoring and evaluation of training taught at Company level. (See Recommendation No. 12).

LONGEVITY PAY

Any member of the Fire or Police Department who is employed as a Police Officer or Firefighter regardless of pay grade is eligible for longevity pay based on the aggregate number of years he or she has served as a member of the Department. Uniformed personnel receive this compensation in addition to the regular salary prescribed for the class and pay grade in which they serve. Longevity payments to uniformed personnel of the Fire Department currently total more than \$800,000 a year.

A half-step above the maximum rate is given upon completion of ten years, a one-step above the maximum rate is given upon the completion of fifteen years, and one and one-half steps is given above the maximum rate after the completion of twenty years of aggregate service.

In 1970 the Jacobs Company, Inc., completed a study and evaluation of the Police and Fire classification and pay structure. In that study Jacobs recommended doing away with longevity pay based on the following reasons:

Longevity pay features in government pay plans became popular in a period when prevailing rates and cost of living were increasing at a much slower rate and government pay schedules were only infrequently adjusted upwards. The purpose was to give an employee in a position where opportunities for promotion were limited something to look forward to after he reached the maximum rate in the pay range for his job and thus, theoretically, to improve morale and reduce turnover.

In the Los Angeles setting today, and with the adoption of recommendations in this report, the reasons for having longevity pay for policemen and firemen are no longer present. There is every likelihood that the salary schedules will have to be adjusted upwards every year in the foreseeable future. The position of fireman is far from a dead-end road and that of policeman will not be either with the considerable opportunities in promotion now in the fire service and the greatly

increased opportunities for promotion in the recommended plan for the police service.

With the improved base salaries recommended in this report, the continuation of a longevity pay plan would simply provide a reward for not getting promoted and reduce the incentive for policemen and firemen to qualify for promotion.

Therefore, it is recommended that longevity pay be discontinued with adoption of the proposed pay plan.

In addition to the increased promotional opportunities for firefighters, increased compensation is available by working overtime. Currently, there are enough overtime opportunities for nearly everyone in the Department and on a regular basis there are a number of unfilled vacancies because of lack of volunteers to work this overtime. (See Recommendation No. 2).

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM

The Fire Department's revised Affirmative Action Program issued September 15, 1977, lists the numerical goals and action plans necessary to assure equal employment opportunities and accomplish a representative ratio of minorities in the Department's work force. In addition to hiring and promoting personnel consistent with the City Charter, City Ordinances, and City laws, compliance is required pursuant to a Consent Decree, entered into between the United States of America and the City of Los Angeles in July, 1974. Proceedings leading up to the Consent Decree began in 1972 when the United States Justice Department filed suit against the City of Los Angeles in the case of United States v. City of Los Angeles, Civil Action No. 72-1806-LTL. In that action, the Justice Department alleged that the City had discriminated on the basis of race in hiring firefighters. That suit was resolved by a negotiated Consent Decree which was approved and filed in July, 1974.

The Consent Decree basically obligates the City to attempt to increase the number of minority individuals hired as firefighters. According to the Decree, the City must meet both long range minority employment goals and interim hiring goals which will assure substantive progress toward achievement of a racial and ethnic composition more closely representative of the community as a whole.

In October, 1976, Mr. Christopher Hoff and certain other named plaintiffs filed a suit against the City in which they alleged that they were discriminated against when they did not receive an appointment to a firefighter training class in 1976. This lawsuit raises issues relative to the scope and effect of the Consent Decree and the appropriateness of the City's implementation. Further, proceedings in the Hoff litigation are now expected to begin in May, 1978.

Minority composition of the Firefighter recruitment effort since the Consent Decree was issued indicates that minorities hired since February, 1975, equaled 50.6%. The proportion of those covered by the Consent Decree, i.e., Black, Spanish surname, and Asian, is 47.9%.

Numerical goals and progress in attaining these goals for a representative ratio of minorities in each occupational

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In January, 1971, the Department of Defense and the Department of State were advised that the Central Intelligence Agency had received information from a source that the Soviet Union was planning to launch a nuclear attack on the United States. This information was obtained from a source who had been in contact with a high-ranking official of the Soviet Union. The Central Intelligence Agency was alerted to this information and was able to identify the source as a member of the Soviet Union's intelligence apparatus. The Central Intelligence Agency was able to identify the source as a member of the Soviet Union's intelligence apparatus. The Central Intelligence Agency was able to identify the source as a member of the Soviet Union's intelligence apparatus.

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category in the Department are established on a fiscal year basis through 1982.

A review of the Department's work force indicates underrepresentation of all minorities and women within the occupational categories of Protective Services, Technician, Professional, and Officials and Administrators. All minorities and women except American Indian are underrepresented in the Paraprofessional occupational category. The Office and Clerical occupational category has no underrepresentation of minorities or women. All minorities except Asian Americans and women are adequately represented in the Service/Maintenance category. The last category of Skilled Craft indicates Blacks, Spanish-surnamed, and women are underrepresented.

With an annual attrition of 190 uniformed positions a year and a hiring ratio of 50% minorities, representation in higher promotional occupational categories in the Department will be achievable.

The Chief Engineer anticipates that the Fire Department's Affirmative Action goals will be achieved through a positive affirmative action program of recruitment by the Personnel Department and the Fire Department's current Recruit Training Program. The current Hoff suit against the City could result in a revision of the Department's Affirmative Action Program.

The Personnel Department has filed with the Mayor in June, 1977, an Affirmative Action Task Force report which contains several specific recommendations aimed at improvement of the Fire Department's affirmative action program.

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